State of Utah v. Charles T. Brown : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983
State of Utah v. Charles T. Brown : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Robert N. Parrish; Attorneys for Respondent;
Mark A. Besendorfer; Attorney for Appellant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Brown, No. 18315 (Utah Supreme Court, 1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH A. SWIECICKI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, and UNITED STATES 

































Case No. 18315 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
Appeal from Determination of the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
JOHN S. CHINDLUND 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Third Floor Many Plaza 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
FLOYD G. ASTIN and K. ALLAN ZABEL 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
1234 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorneys for Def endants-Respoudents F ~ l ED 
J LIN .~ 5 1982 
.,. .. ------ - -- ----· . -- ----- - ----------·-------
Clor~~. StJprcm'l Court, Uta~1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 




STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW PROCEEDINGS 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
ARGUMENT: PLAINTIFF DID NOT VOLUNTARILY LEAVE 
WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE AND, THEREFORE, 





PLAINTIFF WAS TERMINATED 
PLAINTIFF HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR 
REPORTING TO WORK LATE. 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Anthan v. PATCO, 521 F.Supp. 1 (E.D. Mo., 1981) 
Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 568 P.2d 727 / 
(Ut. 1977). 




567 P.2d 626 (Ut. 1977). 10,11,12,14,15 
Statutes 
Utah Employment Security Act - Section 35-4-1 
et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) 
l,2,7,10,11,12,14,15 
(ii) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH A. SWIECICKI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, and UNITED STATES 


































Case No. 18315 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action, plaintiff seeks to obtain unemployment 
compensation benefits under the Utah Employment Security Act, 
§ 35-4-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 1 
DISPOSITION IN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW PROCEEDINGS 
On August 6, 1981, 2 plaintiff was prevented by his 
employer from reporting to work and was advised his termination 
was in progress. Plaintiff was officially terminated from his 
job as an air traffic controller at the Salt Lake International 
1 Hereinafter, reference to the Utah Code Annotated 
will be by •u.c.A.•, followed by designation of the appropriate 
section thereof. 
2 All dates herein are in 1981 unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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Airport effective September 15. On August 27, plaintiff 
applied for unemployment insurance benefits. on September 18, 
plaintiff's application was denied under u.c.A. s 35-4-5(b)(l) 
and (d). On October 13, plaintiff appealed. on December 30, 
Appeal Referee, Stanley H. Griffin, affirmed the denial of 
plaintiff's application for benefits under U.C.A. S 35-4-5(a) 
and (d). The appeal referee did not rely in any part upon 
U.C.A. § 35-4-5(b)(l) in so ruling. On January 8, 1982, plain-
tiff appealed Referee Griffin's decision to the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment 
Security (hereinafter the •Board of Review•). In a decision 
dated February 16, 1982, the Board of Review (member Richard H. 
Schone separately concurring) affirmed the Appeal Referee's 
decision. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-4-lO(i), plaintiff filed his 
Petition for Writ of Review herein on March 15, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board 
of Review affirming the denial of unemployment benefits to 
plaintiff. Plaintiff asks the Court to grant him unemployment 
benefits and award him costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
his appeals. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
From February 1974 to August 1981, plaintiff was 
employed by the Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter 
•FAA•) as an air traffic controller (R. 0040). As of August 
plaintiff was working at the Salt Lake Air Traffic Control 
Center. On or about August 3, a nationwide air traffic con-
trollers' strike commenced. While this fact is not expressly 
stated in the Record, it is acknowledged by plaintiff that a 
strike commenced on August 3. Plaintiff failed to report for 
work on August 3, 4 and 5 (R. 0041). Under the guidelines of 
President Reagan's •amnesty period•, air traffic controllers 
had until their first scheduled shift after 11:00 a.m. Eastern 
Standard Time, August 5, within which to report to work (R. 
0042-0043). Plaintiff's first scheduled shift after the dead-
line was 8:00 a.m. on August 6 (R. 0042-0043). There is a dis-
crepancy in the record as to the events of August 6, concerning 
plaintiff's attempts to return to work. It is the testimony of 
Clyde Denham, chief of the traffic control tower at the Salt 
Lake International Airport, that plaintiff talked to Warren 
3 References to the Record on Appeal will be desig-
nated •R• followed by the respective page number of the 
Record. There is some confusion in that part of the record 
comprised of the transcript of plaintiff's hearing before the 
Appeal Referee, where names of the people testifying were 
mis-designated. To correct this problem and to alleviate con-
fusion, the page numbers of the Record will be given and the 
correct individuals speaking will be named. 
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Lee (deputy chief of the Salt Lake tower) a few times on the 
morning of August 6, prior to plaintiff's individual deadline, 
and was advised as to the time in which he had to 
report under the •amnesty period•. Denham testified further 
that Lee recorded in a telephone log certain remarks by plain-
tiff to the effect that he could not report for work immedi-
ately because he had •made a promise to a particular individual 
or group of individuals. I cannot come out there because I 
would be violating my oath to them•. Warren Lee did not 
testify and the telephone log was not introduced into evidence 
(R. 0045). Plaintiff's testimony of the events of August 6 was 
as follows: plaintiff called Lee at the Salt Lake tower at 
about 7:00 a.m. on August 6, and was informed by Lee that his 
deadline to report to work was at 8:00 a.m. (R. 0047). Until 
this conversation, plaintiff had received no official notifica-
tion or any telegrams informing him of President Reagan's 
•amnesty period• or how the •amnesty period• applied to him (R. 
0041). Plaintiff further testified without contradiction that 
Denham and Lee gave him an extension to his deadline of •about 
an hour• (R. 0047). At about 9:00 or 9:15 a.m., on August 6, 
plaintiff told Lee that he was prepared to report for duty and 
Lee said that that was •[F]ine• (R. 0047). Lee then gave 
plaintiff detailed instructions for gaining access to the con-
trol tower. In this regard, Lee advised plaintiff that he was 
to report to the National Guard unit located at the airport, 
-4-
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give his name and show some kind of identification (R. 0047). 
He would then go through a checkpoint and be transported by the 
National Guard across the air field to the control tower. 
Plaintiff was very concerned about this procedure because he 
had heard rumors that there were armed guards at the checkpoint 
(R. 0047) and he knew thaf there were pickets stationed at the 
entrance to the National Guard checkpoint (R. 0049). Plaintiff 
denies that he told Lee that he would not report to work 
because of an •oath.• On this subject, plaintiff testified 
that because of his physical condition he could not endure the 
reporting procedure described by Lee--• I cannot do something 
like that at this time• (R. 0047-0048). Concerning his physi-
cal condition, plaintiff testified that he had suffered 
anxiety, insomnia and other disorders since the last few days 
of July 1981 (R. 0041-0042). As revealed by a letter from Dr. 
David A. Schein, M.D., Ph.D. (R. 0064), plaintiff was seen and 
treated on August 7, with follow-up consul tat ions thereafter. 
Plaintiff's stress-induced emotional and physiological disturb-
ances were treated with Valium (R. 0042, 0064). The factors 
which caused plaintiff this stress are outlined in plaintiff's 
written response to the FAA's notice to plaintiff of its intent 
to terminate him (R. 0062-0063). In addition, during his 
testimony before the Appeal Referee plaintiff specifically 
• 
recalled threats of reprisals that he had heard (R. 0048-0049). 
-s-
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Following his conversation with Lee and Denham on the 
morning of August 6, plaintiff was contacted by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice and 
advised that a restraining order was in effect (R. 0041, 
0048). This •1iterally scared the hell out of• plaintiff (R. 
0041) and, at approxirnate~y 11:30 p.m., August 6, he reported 
to work (R. 0041, 0049). There were no pickets present at this 
time (R. 0049). When plaintiff reported to work he was advised 
by the deputy chief on duty •that an intent to terminate was in 
progress• and that he should leave the facility immediately (R. 
0041). 
On August 9, plaintiff received a letter from Clyde 
Denham (R. 0065-0066) stating that it was the intent of Mr. 
Denham to remove plaintiff from his job as air traffic control 
specialist. Plaintiff responded to Mr. Denham's letter with an 
August 19 letter setting forth his reasons for not reporting 
for work until 11:30 p.m., August 6. (R. 0062-0063). Plain-
tiff also orally presented his position to Mr. Denham on August 
19. Thereafter, plaintiff received .a letter from Mr. Denham, 
dated September 8, terminating him as an air traffic control 
specialist effective September 15 (R. 0056). 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT VOLUNTARILY LEAVE WORK WITHOUT 
GOOD CAUSE AND, THEREFORE, IS ELIGIBLE FOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS. 
U.C.A. § 35-4-S(a) states that an individual will not 
be eligible for benefits tf the claimant •1eft work voluntarily 
without good cause.• This disqualification is subject to the 
proviso 
that no claimant shall be ineligible for 
benefits if the claimant leaves work under 
circumstances of such a nature that it would 
be contrary to equity and good conscience to 
impose a disqualification. 
In addition to this proviso, the statute directs the 
Industrial Commission to 
consider for the purposes of this act, the 
reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence 
a genuine continuing attachment to the labor 
market in reaching a determination of 
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is 
contrary to equity and good conscience. 
In determining whether plaintiff is ineligible for 
unemployment benefits under U.C.A. § 35-4-S(a), it is necessary 
to analyze and apply the above-noted provisions of the 
statute. 
analysis: 
To do this, plaintiff has employed the following 
(I) was plaintiff terminated or did he voluntarily 
leave work within the meaning of the statute? (II) Assuming 
that plaintiff voluntarily left work, what was the extent of 
his leaving work (i.e., did he quit), and do the facts estab-
-7-
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lish good cause for such leaving? In evaluating the issue of 
good cause (i.e., defined by the statute as circumstances under 
which a disqualification would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience), plaintiff has, pursuant to the provisions of the 
statute, included herein a discussion concerning the reason-
.• 
ableness of plaintiff's actions (under the circumstances), and 
the extent to which those actions evidenced a •genuine continu-
ing attachment• to the labor market. 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS TERMINATED. 
As established in the Statement of Facts, plaintiff 
did not know of the time by which he could report to work until 
he was advised by warren Lee at approximately 7: 00 a.m. on 
August 6, that he had until 8:00 a.m. that day. During a sub-
sequent conversation with Lee, plaintiff was given an extension 
of this deadline of approximately one hour. At about 9:00 a.m. 
or 9:15 a.rn. on August 6, plaintiff told Lee that he was pre-
pared to report to work. Lee stated that this would be 
However, when Lee told plaintiff of the procedure 
which had to be followed in order to report, plaintiff realized 
that he could not physically or emotionally handle the pro-
cedure, which procedure involved potential confrontation 
between armed guards and pickets. As candidly stated by plain-
tiff, 
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•it scared the hell out of me. I, I, all I 
wanted to do was be a neutral party, get the 
(?) to work, get my paycheck, get the hell 
out. I don't want to be caught in them wars · 
there.• (R. 0048) 
some time later that day, plaintiff was advised by the FBI and 
the Department of Justice that a restraining order was in 
effect. This •literally scared the hell out of• plaintiff, and 
he reported to work at about 11:30 p.m. that night, when no 
pickets were present. Upon reporting to work, plaintiff was 
told to leave because an intent to terminate was in progress. 
Thereafter, plaintiff received a notice of intent to remove 
from the FAA, dated August 9. Al though plaintiff submitted a 
written and verbal response to this notice, he was terminated 
effective September 15 (R. 0056). 
These facts simply do not establish that plaintiff 
voluntarily left work in the sense that he •quit• so as to be 
disqualified from receiving benefits for the period after his 
attempt to report to work. On the contrary, the facts reveal 
that for the first days of the strike plaintiff was emotionally 
and physically incapable of reporting to work. When plaintiff 
finally was able to agree to report to work on the morning of 
August 6, he was immediately confronted with a reporting pro-
cedure fraught with potential confrontation between armed 
guards and pickets. Initially, plaintiff was physically and 
emotionally unprepared and unable to cope with this procedure. 
However, following contact by the FBI and the Department of 
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Justice, plaintiff was able to pull himself together and he 
reported to work. Certainly, plaintiff did not feel or believe 
that he had •quit• work and the actions of the FAA belie any 
such conclusion, in that they sent plaintiff a letter of intent 
to remove, solicited and considered verbal and written 
responses from plaintiff: and sent plaintiff a termination 
notice. At no time has the FAA ever asserted that plaintiff 
quit his job. 
At most, it could be argued (but it is not conceded by 
plaintiff) that under these circumstances plaintiff should be 
disqualified for the period August 3 through 11:30 p.m. August 
6 under the theory that during this period he left work volun-
tarily without good cause. However, the facts cannot support 
the finding that by reporting late, plaintiff permanently and 
irrevocably quit his employment so as to justify a disqualifi-
cation under U.C.A. S 35-4-5(a) for the period on and after 
11:30 p.m. August 6. What is meant by voluntarily leaving work 
for purposes of § 35-4-5(a) is something more than reporting to 
work late. It means an act, such as retiring, which estab-
1 ishes an intent to permanently cease work. ~' Denby v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626 (Ut. 
1977). 
What the Appeal Referee and the Board of Review have 
done by their rulings is to seize upon u.c.A. § 35-4-S(a) and 
apply it to a situation that legally and factually amounts to a 
-10-
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termination, which, as recognized by Tom L. Brant in his deci-
sion of September 18 (R. 0054), must be evaluated under the 
provisions of U.C.A. § 35-4-5(b)(l). When examined under this 
later section, plaintiff's post-August 6 disqualification can-
not be sustained. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, 
·~ plaintiff's conduct does not, as a matter of law, rise to the 
level of conduct which is •deliberate, wilful or wanton and 
adverse to the employer's rightful interest•, as required by 
this section of the statute. ~' Continental Oil Company v. 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 568 P.2d 
727 (Ut. 1977). 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR REPORTING TO WORK LATE. 
Even assuming that U.C.A. S 35-4-5(a) applies (because 
plaintiff •1eft work voluntarily• when he reported to work 
beyond his deadline as extended by Lee on the morning of August 
6), the undisputed facts establish that there was good cause 
for this delay in reporting. 
The only recent Utah Supreme Court case dealing with 
U.C.A. § 35-4-5(a), the •voluntary quit• section of the Utah 
Employment security Act, is Denby v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 567 P.2d 626 (Ut. 1977). While 
the facts of Denby are quite different from those of the 
instant case, the statements of the court on the standard of 
•good cause• are applicable. In Denby the plaintiff volun-
-11-
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tarily retired from the United States Postal service in order 
to move to his brother's ranch in Montana. Be applied for 
unemployment insurance benefits. His application was denied, 
in part, on grounds not applicable in the instant case, i.e., 
because he did not make a reasonable and active attempt to find 
work, as required by U;C.A. S 35-4-4(c). In addition to 
affirming the finding of disqualification under U.C.A. 
§ 35-4-4(c), the Supreme Court upheld Denby's disqualification 
for a four-week period under U.C.A. S 35-4-S(a), on the ground 
that Denby left work voluntarily, without good cause. In so 
holding, the Court affirmed the appeal referee's decision that 
Denby' s asserted reasons for retiring (that he suffered from 
arthritis and mental stress and that mandatory overtime was a 
contributing factor) did not amount to •compelling reasons• for 
his retirement. The Court went on to explain that the question 
of •good cause• for voluntarily leaving employment is a ques-
tion of law and fact for the administrative agency. Citing two 
Oregon cases, the Court said that •good cause• is 
such cause as would similarly affect persons 
of reasonable and normal sensitivity, and is 
limited to those instances where the unem-
ployment is caused by external pressures so 
compelling that a reasonably prudent person, 
exercising ordinary common sense and pru-
dence, would be justified in quitting under 
similar circumstances. 
Denby v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 
626, 630 (Ut. 1977). 
-12-
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In evaluating the issue of good cause in this case, it 
is critical to bear in mind that the act of plaintiff to be 
examined is his failure to report to work during the period 
from approximately 9:15 a.m. to 11:30 p.m. on August 6, and not 
his failure to report to work on August 3, 4, or 5. This 
follows since those controllers who missed all or part of these 
latter days, but then returned to work within President 
Reagan's •amnesty period•, were not penalized in any manner for 
having missed work on these days. 
As set forth under Point I above, plaintiff did not 
intend to voluntarily quit his job when he delayed reporting 
for work on August 6. All the facts of this case compel the 
conclusion that plaintiff desired to keep his job. However, 
plaintiff was subjected to the following external pressures 
which caused him emotional and physical problems, resulting in 
his delay in reporting to work: 
1. statements by union officials that those who 
reported to work would be •taken care of• -( R. 0049, 
0062-0063); 
2. information that those who were working were 
being harassed (R. 0062-0063); 
3. misrepresentations by union officials as to 
what would be done by the FAA to those who returned to 
work (R. 0062-0063); 
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4. unclear/confusing information concerning the 
President's amnesty period and how it applied to 
plaintiff (R. 0062-0063); 
5. a reporting procedure that allowed for the 
possibility of potential violence (i.e., armed guards 
confronting pickets). 
On their face, items 1 and 2 above may not appear com-
pelling. However, as shown in the case of Anthan v. PATCO, 521 
F.Supp. 1 (E.D. Mo. 1981), due to the high degree of coopera-
tion and assistance which is required between air traffic con-
trollers, a controller who is shunned by other controllers can 
be placed in a life-endangering situation and prevented from 
effectively performing his job. In Anthan, supra, the court 
awarded the plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages as a 
result of the work-related outrageous conduct of his fellow 
controllers. 
In examining the question of good cause, determining 
the intent of the Legislature is very important. As observed 
in Denby, supra at 630: 
The Legislature contemplated that when an 
individual voluntarily leaves a job under 
the pressure of circumstances which may 
reasonably be viewed as having compelled him 
to do so, the termination of his employment 
is involuntary for purposes of this act. 
Furthermore, the lack of findings of fact by the 
appeal referee and the Board of Review on the above circum-
stances compels the conclusion that they did not consider the 
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equity and good conscience provisions of u.c.A. s 35-4-S(a). 
These ~revisions require the Industrial Commission to examine 
whether, under the circumstances of the individual case, plain-
tiff's actions were reasonable and evidenced •a genuine con-
tinuing attachment to the labor market. • Based upon • • • 
these circumstances, the Commission must then decide whether a 
disqualification is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
The circumstances cited above may not have justified 
plaintiff in permanently leaving his work. However, these 
factors are sufficiently compelling within the definition of 
the phrase •good cause• as defined in Denby, supra, to justify 
plaintiff's delay in reporting to work for several hours past 
his deadline. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts, including those found by the 
appeal referee and the Board of Review and those appearing as 
undisputed in the Record, establish that the action of the 
Board of Review was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable in 
disqualifying plaintiff for benefits after he attempted to 
report to work several hours after the expiration of his •dead-
line• on August 6. As openly revealed by the concurring 
opinion of Board member, Richard H. Schone, the decision in 
plaintiff's case was not a decision on the individual facts of 
plaintiff's case, but rather, a decision on the overall issue 
of the air traffic controllers' strike. There is no evidence 
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in the record to show that plaintiff engaged in or supported 
the strike. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that 
plaintiff wanted to work and attempted to do so as best he 
could under the circumstances. Furthermore, the issue of 
whether the FAA had good or legal cause to terminate plaintiff 
or other air traffic controllers should not have been the ques-
tion before the Board of Review. Rather, the question was 
whether plaintiff, under the facts of his individual case, was 
entitled to receive unemployment benefits under the Utah 
Employment security Act. Under the facts of this case, plain-
tiff is entitled to such benefits for the period following his 
attempt to return to work on August 6. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 1982. 
PRINCE, 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this 25th day of June, 1982, I hereby certify that I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant to the following: 
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Floyd G. Astin/K. Allan Zabel 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
1234 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Mr. Robert Huffine/Mr. Robert Blunk 
Personnel Off ice ARM-16 
Labor Relations Branch 
FAA Rocky MountaiR Region 
10455 East 25th Avenue 
Aurora, Colorado 80010 
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